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EU ETS, Free Allocations, and Activity Level
Thresholds: The Devil Lies in the Details
Frédéric Branger, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Oliver Sartor, Misato Sato
Abstract: It is well known that discontinuous jumps or thresholds in tax or sub-
sidies are socially inefﬁcient, because they create incentives to make strategic behav-
ioral changes that lead to substantial increases in private beneﬁts. This paper in-
vestigates these distortions in the context of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme,
where activity level thresholds (ALTs) were introduced in Phase 3 to reduce the
overallocation of free allowances to low-activity installations. Using installation-level
data, we ﬁnd evidence that cement producers indeed respond to such thresholds
when confronted with low demand, by strategically adjusting output to obtain more
free allocation. We estimate that in 2012, ALTs induced excess cement clinker pro-
duction of 6.4 Mt (5% of total EU output), and in affected regions this further
distorted trade patterns and reversed carbon intensity improvements. As intended,
ALTs reduced free allocation by 4%; however, a linear scheme (output-based alloca-
tion) would have achieved a 32% reduction.
JEL Codes: D24, H23, L23, L61
Keywords: Activity level thresholds, Carbon trading, Cement, EU ETS, Free
allowance allocations
STARTING FROM PHASE 3 , the EU Emissions Trading System introduced a new
rule that links the level of free allocation to the activity level of an installation—
known as activity level thresholds (ALTs). While put in place with the intention to
reduce excess free allocation to low-activity plants, the new rule creates incentives for
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installations to “game” output levels in order to maximize free allocation. This paper
measures the distortionary effects resulting from ALTs, by exploiting the natural
experiment of the introduction of the new rule in 2012, and discusses whether the
disadvantages of ALTs outweigh the advantages.
The justiﬁcation for using free allocations in emission trading schemes has evolved
over time. Historically, in schemes such as the US acid rain program, it was introduced
as a compensation mechanism for the owners of existing industrial assets for a change
in the rules of the game (Ellerman et al. 2000). A lump sum transfer would be made
to existing assets through a predetermined amount of annual free allocations for a
given number of years. Such methods are termed “grandfathering,” “historic,” “lump
sum,” or “ex ante” allocation. New assets would not be allowed free allocations and
thus would have to pay for all their permits on the market. As long as the free allo-
cations are predetermined, all assets (old and new) would compete on the same play-
ing ﬁeld, the price of permits would provide the same opportunity cost for mitigating
pollution, and in theory, the output price of the goods sold would incorporate the price
signal for consumers.
More recently, free allocations have been explicitly used (or have been proposed to
be used) as a way to strategically alleviate the risk of offshoring production and
emissions (so-called carbon leakage) for Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed (EITE)
sectors such as cement, chemicals, and steel. Economists generally agree that, in a
world of unequal carbon prices, full auctioning together with some form of border
leveling of prices would be the optimal approach to tackling leakage (Hepburn et al.
2006; Monjon and Quirion 2011). However, the required degree of international co-
operation to achieve such a system has not yet been forthcoming. Thus, a number of
papers suggest that, from an economic efﬁciency standpoint, free “output-based” alloca-
tion (OBA) would be a preferred third-best option (Fischer and Fox 2007; Quirion
2009; Fischer and Fox 2012; Meunier, Ponssard, and Quirion 2014). OBA reduces
the effect of the carbon price on the output price, which reduces trade distortions, but
also means that the ﬁnal price does not fully reﬂect the carbon price, which reduces
efﬁciency.
OBA has been implemented within the Californian emissions trading system
(ETS) that began in 2012 (California Air Resources Board 2013). In contrast the
EU ETS Phase 3 is unique in using a complex system. It combines an ex ante calcu-
lation of an allocation and subsequent lump-sum transfer based on historic output (and
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multiplied by an emissions intensity benchmark) with a possible ex post calculation and
adjustment of this lump sum according to rules related to actual capacity and activity
levels as deﬁned in Decision 2011/278/EU (European Commission 2011).1 Situations
in which ex post adjustments occur include the arrival of new entrants into the
market, plant capacity extension/reduction, plant closure, and partial cessation or re-
commencement of activity at an existing plant. These latter rules are governed by the
activity level thresholds.2
Qualitatively, ETS schemes with ALTs approximate OBA: the amount of free
allocations will vary with the activity level, and the overallocation proﬁts3 associated
with ex ante schemes will be reduced.4 The advantage of ALT rules is that they allow
for a ﬁxed cap (in fact, a cap that will not exceed a predetermined amount for existing
installations and the reserve for new entrants). One disadvantage is that they introduce
an element of complexity in the scheme. Under these nonlinear rules, the lump-sum
transfer of allowances to EITE sectors is reduced by 50%, 75%, or 100% if the annual
level of production of the plant falls below 50%, 25%, or 10%, respectively, of the
historical activity level (HAL) of production that is used to determine the ex ante
allocation (European Commission 2011).
A second disadvantage is that the ALTs introduce distortions, which is the focus
of this paper. A recent study on the EU ETS impacts on the cement sector during
2005–13 (Neuhoff et al. 2014) found preliminary evidence through data analysis and
comprehensive interviews with industry executives that new ALTs introduced in 2013
provided cement installations the incentive to adjust output levels.5 The rationale is as
follows. Since the free allocation in year t + 1 is directly linked to output in year t, if
output levels lie below the threshold levels, there may be an incentive to increase
1. Note that ex ante and ex post refer to whether the calculation of the freely allocated
amount of allowances occurs prior to or following the production and emissions for which
allowances are to be allocated.
2. New entrant provision and closing rules were already in place in Phases 1 and 2 of the
EU ETS. A closure rule is also used in the Californian ETS.
3. Overallocation proﬁts come from the allowances surplus automatically generated when
the number of free allowances received is higher than emissions necessary to manufacture the
amount of cement produced (Branger and Quirion 2015). Overallocation proﬁts can be dis-
tinguished from windfall proﬁts, which refer to the proﬁts from free allocation where emitters
additionally proﬁt from passing on the marginal CO2 opportunity cost to product prices,
despite receiving the allowances for free. Overallocation proﬁts can occur even in the absence
of cost pass-through, if output fall short of historic levels.
4. Windfall and overallocation gains have been a persistent shortcoming of the use of ex
ante free-allocation mechanism in the EU ETS (e.g., Sandbag Climate Campaign 2011;
Laing et al. 2014; Sartor, Pallière, and Lecourt 2014).
5. Three coauthors of this paper participated in this study and in conducting interviews
that were carried out.
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output in year t to achieve the relevant threshold (.10, .25, .50) and receive higher free
allocations in year t + 1. In this paper, such strategic adjustments of output motivated
by ALTs are termed “gaming” behavior, in line with the management literature (e.g.,
Jensen 2003). Neuhoff et al. (2014) report that company executives consistently con-
ﬁrm in interviews that these practices indeed occur, where the regional cement mar-
ket demand is insufﬁcient to reach the minimum activity level. They identify three
channels to marginally increase production in a plant that is producing below the
threshold:
• Production shifting among local plants, that is, reducing the production at
a plant that is well above the threshold to increase the production at the
plant that is below; this generates some transport costs so that it can be
too costly to be undertaken at a large scale.6
• Exports of clinker to other markets so as not to perturb the local market
while increasing production; this generates some cost in terms of export
price rebate, since these exports would not naturally occur.
• Increasing the clinker to cement ratio, that is, incorporate within limits
more clinker in cement instead of using less costly cementitious additives
such as slag or ﬂying ashes; this directly generates some cost.
In this paper, we revisit the existence and the magnitude of the distortions and
ask whether or not the installation outputs and trade ﬂows in 2012 were affected by
the free allocation policy change for year 2013. Our analysis is conducted in a unique
context of low demand induced by a severe economic downturn. The construction of
a counterfactual requires some assumptions, the most signiﬁcant of which considers
that consumption and price levels for cement are independent of the allocation scheme.
This assumption is consistent with the observations made in Neuhoff et al. (2014).
We discuss in detail how our results would be affected if we had adopted the more
standard assumption in which grandfathering and output-based allocation would
lead to different cement and price levels.
Empirical studies on the impact of ALTs or similar rules remain limited. Most of
these studies have examined the distortive effects of combining ex ante allocations
with ex post new entrant and plant closure provisions. Neuhoff, Keats, and Sato
(2006), Ellerman (2008), and Pahle, Fan, and Schill (2011) compared the new en-
trant provision relative to auctioning. These papers argued that new entrant provi-
sions distort via their impact on investment decisions in the electricity sector (essen-
6. McKinsey & Company (2008) estimate that transport costs for a tonne of clinker from
Alexandria to Rotterdam are roughly €20/tonne, that inland shipping costs are approximately
€3.5/tonne per 100 km, and that the inland road transport is about 8.6€/ton per 100 km.
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tially by acting as a subsidy). Meunier et al. (2014) compared this same provision with
an output-based scheme whenever ﬁrms face an uncertain demand in the EU cement
sector. They showed that the entrant provision could induce excessive new invest-
ments while offering limited protection against leakage. Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan
(forthcoming), this time for the US cement sector, compare ex ante schemes with clo-
sure rules with an output-based scheme and show that the lifetime of old inefﬁcient
plants would be unduly extended with the former while temporarily reducing leak-
age. Only this last paper has discussed the impacts of the possible distortions associated
with the (limited) addition of nonlinear ex post adjustments to ex ante allocation via
the use of ALTs, such as introduced in the EU ETS Phase 3 (2013–20).
The ﬁndings in this paper could be potentially relevant to other EITEs with sim-
ilar characteristics. Altogether, we argue that the beneﬁts of implementing ALTs in
terms of reduced overallocation proﬁts will not necessarily outweigh the signiﬁcant costs
in the form of distortions. Hence it may be preferable to abandon ALTs for OBA for
some sectors. We discuss some broader questions if such a change were adopted.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the EU ETS Phase 3
allocation rules, the predicted gaming behavior from thresholds and the alternative
allocation rules. Section 2 describes our conceptual framework for evaluating the
effects of ALTs, the methodology, data sources, and the key assumptions involved in
our analysis. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy
recommendations.
1. ETS FREE ALLOCATION RULES AND GAMING OF ALTS
1.1. The EU ETS Phase 3 Free Allocation Rules
In Phase 3 of the EU ETS, installations in sectors “deemed to be exposed to carbon
leakage” are eligible to receive free allocation of emission allowances. The determina-
tion of the free allowances for each installation combines an ex ante calculation, based
on the historic output for existing installations (known as the “historical activity level”
or HAL)7 or the initial capacity for new installations, with an ex post calculation
based on the ongoing activity level of this installation as deﬁned in Decision 2011/
278/EU (European Commission 2011). The ex post calculation provides stepwise
adjustments intended to reﬂect changes in market volumes. These adjustments follow
complex procedures.
For existing installations, the precise relationship that determines the next-period
allocation from ex ante and ex post values is summarized by equations (1) and (2)
7. The benchmarked product-related historical activity level (HAL) is deﬁned as the
maximum of the median annual historical production of the product in the installation (or
subinstallation) concerned during either 2005–8 or 2009–10 (cf. Decision 2011/278/EU).
Distortions from EU ETS Activity Level Thresholds Branger et al. 405
below. The amount of free allocations to an installation, i, at period t + 1, for an
eligible product, p is denoted Ai,p,t+1.
Ai;p;tþ1 = CSCFtþ1  Bp HALi;p  ALCFtþ1 qtHALi;p
 
: ð1Þ
In equation (1), CSCFt+1 is the uniform cross-sectoral correction factor,
8 Bp is the
benchmark for product p,9 HALi,p represents the historical activity level, and ALCF
is the activity level correction factor, which depends on the ratio qi,p,t/HALi,p, qi,p,t
being the output of the eligible product in year t. The ALCF deﬁnes a stepwise






1; qt ≥ 0:5HAL
0:5; 0:25HAL  qt < 0:5HAL
0:25; 0:10HAL  qt < 0:25HAL
0; 0 HAL  qt < 0:10HAL
8>><
>>: ð2Þ
For new installations, the historic activity level is replaced by the capacity, to be
precisely determined according to the rules.10
1.2. Gaming and Thresholds
In this paper, gaming behavior refers to artiﬁcially increasing production to attain
thresholds, in order to obtain more allowances. Consider a plant for which the
“business as usual” activity level for year 2012 would be at, say, 40% of its historic
activity level. Increasing production up to 50% of its historic activity level allows for
doubling the free allocation received. A rough calculation with a clinker plant illus-
trates the potential beneﬁt of gaming. Suppose HAL refers to 1 Mt/year (millions of
metric tons per year), and the business as usual is 0.4 Mt in 2012 so that the plant
needs to increase production by 0.1 Mt to achieve the 50% threshold. At 8 €/t CO2
in 2013 (average future price of December 2013 during year 2012), if the ﬁrm gets
100% of free allowances relative to HAL it is worth €5.8 million (0.9427 × 1Mt ×
0.766 tCO2/t × 8€/tCO2, numbers being, respectively, CSCF, HAL, clinker bench-
mark, and carbon price); losing 50% allowances implies a loss of €2.9 million. Sup-
pose the emission intensity is 0.8 t CO2/t of clinker (slightly above the benchmark).
8. This is determined by comparing the sum of preliminary total annual amounts of emis-
sion allowances allocated free to installations (not electricity) for each year over the period
2013–20. In 2013 the CSCF is equal to 0.9427; then it declines at 1.74% per year.
9. Product benchmarks in general reﬂect the average performance of the 10% most ef-
ﬁcient installations in the sector or subsector in the years 2007–8. The benchmarks are
calculated for products rather than inputs Decision 2011/278/EU.
10. Guidance document no. 7 in European Commission (2011).
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The increase in emissions is then equal to 0.080 t CO2, which at 8 €/t CO2 amounts
to €0.64 million.
In the presence of activity level thresholds, the net beneﬁt of gaming in terms of
allocations is the difference between the increased free allocations and the certiﬁcates
needed to cover the increased production (in our case €2.26 million = €2.9 million
–€0.64 million). The net beneﬁt depends on the price of CO2, the beneﬁt rising
with the price. However, this artiﬁcial increase of production involves cost inefﬁcien-
cies, which can be assumed to be an increasing function of the extra production,
independent of the CO2 price but dependent on the plant. These cost inefﬁciencies
can up to a point cancel out the gains from increased free allocation. This is shown
in ﬁgure 1, where gaming is undertaken only if the increased production to attain
the threshold is less than ΔX0. In our case, if the extra production of 0.1 ton of
clinker does not involve cost inefﬁciencies of more than €2.53 million, gaming is
proﬁtable.
Evidence of strong responses to thresholds—where small changes in behaviors
lead to large changes in outcomes—has been found in the recent literature. Sallee
and Slemrod (2012) ﬁnd evidence that the automakers respond to thresholds (or
“notches”) in the gas guzzler tax and to mandatory fuel economy labels by manipu-
lating fuel economy ratings in order to qualify for more favorable treatment. The
management control literature also ﬁnds that managers tend to react strongly to the
existence of discontinuities. This is the case, for example, when bonuses depend on
the achievement of a given level of sales for a sales manager, a given productivity
Figure 1. The value of gaming. The installation engages in gaming when ΔX < ΔX 0. I
refers to the carbon intensity of the plant. Beneﬁts are the increased free allocations minus
increased emissions.
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indicator for a plant manager, a given return on investment for a business manager, a
given level of the total shareholder return for a CEO, etc. (Locke 2001). In a well-
known article, Jensen (2003) points out that such “gaming” behavior is perfectly
rational under threshold rules. He argues that these rules imply an agency cost that is
largely underestimated and suggests that linear bonus schemes should be preferable.
1.3. Alternative Free Allocation Rules
The EU ETS Phase 3 rules can be compared with an ex ante allocation without
ALTs or an output-based allocation scheme. Under OBA, the next period alloca-
tion is determined according to an equation similar to equation (1) (with HALi;p
ALCFðqi;p;t=HALi;pÞ replaced by qi;p;t). The scheme therefore has no thresholds, and
the historic activity level HAL is replaced by the previous year activity level qt as
allocations are altered on a continuous yearly production basis. In this paper, we will
evaluate the impact of the ALTs by contrasting four scenarios, with their respective
acronym:
• Ex ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) and gaming
(EXALTG),
• Ex ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) without
gaming (EXALTNG),
• Ex ante free allocation without ALTs (EX),
• Ex post output-based allocation (OBA).
Scenario EXALTG corresponds to what was observed in Phase 3. Scenario
EXALTNG applies the same rules, but it is a hypothetical scenario where no gaming
behavior is observed (every variable is identical as in EX, except the allocation, which
follows a different rule). EXALTNG, EX, and OBA represent counterfactuals.
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Since 2013 is the ﬁrst year the threshold rule is in place, the 2012 activity level di-
rectly determines the allocation of allowances for 2013. The preliminary analysis in
Neuhoff et al. (2014) provided evidence of distortions arising from the ALTs rule.
The present study quantiﬁes these distortions.
2.1. The Cement Sector
Our analysis focuses on the cement sector for three reasons.11 First, it ranks amongst
the highest in terms of carbon intensity per value added; thus the effects of free
11. For an overview of the European cement sector, see, e.g., Hourcade et al. (2007) and
Boyer and Ponssard (2013).
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allocation rules are magniﬁed. The cement production process can be divided into
two basic stages: production of clinker and the subsequent grinding and blending of
clinker with other mineral components to produce cement. The ﬁrst stage (clinker
production) accounts for the bulk of carbon emissions in cement production. Alloca-
tion under the EU ETS is based on a benchmark on clinker.12 The relevant output
involved in the threshold rule is then the quantity of clinker produced. As an inter-
mediate product, clinker is more traded among cement producers than the ﬁnal prod-
uct, cement.13 However, cement is traded as well; hence, the analysis has to be done
simultaneously for both products.
In terms of geographical segmentation the high cost of land transportation of ce-
ment (or clinker) suggests that regional cement consumption be sourced from local
plants. Some imports or exports mostly take place through long haul sea transporta-
tion (rail or river transportations of cement are not well developed within Europe
as opposed to, for instance, the United States). A relevant market is usually deﬁned
in reference to competition analysis. It allows for a precise deﬁnition of consumption,
production facilities, and import and export ﬂows. In the EU, these data can be col-
lected at the member state (country) level, and a number of antitrust analyses are
typically made at this level. In this paper, we shall consider that the member state
provides a good level of segmentation for our analysis.14
Second, as the sector experienced a demand collapse in the order of 50% or more
between 2007 and 2012 in several member states, the ALTs rules were likely to have
been a relevant factor for operational decisions during the period studied. Indeed, we
suspect that the most important differences between scenarios EX and EXALTG
will occur in countries in which cement and clinker consumption in 2012 fell well
short of the historical consumption level, and hence ALTs rules were relevant. For
convenience our results obtained for each member state will be aggregated. The 26
EU ETS member states with ETS-participating clinker production plants will be
12. It could have been based on a cement or a hybrid benchmark instead. The hybrid
benchmark avoids the “clinker-cement paradox” (Quirion 2009). If the benchmarked prod-
uct is cement, plants have an incentive to outsource clinker production. If it is clinker, the
incentive to reduce the clinker-to-cement ratio is lost. In California, the benchmarked prod-
uct is “adjusted clinker and mineral additives produced,” which is equal to QKð1þ r=RÞ,
where QK is the clinker produced, R is the clinker ratio, and r is the “mineral additives ratio”
(limestone and gypsum consumed divided by cement produced). This system gives an incen-
tive to use more mineral additives while preventing clinker outsourcing.
13. International traders do also play a role in this market. Yet in 2011 around 50% of
world cement trading was undertaken by the top ﬁve global cement companies (see, e.g.,
ﬁnancial analyst’s report Jefferies [2012, 153]).
14. Some small countries are regrouped into larger entities which are coherent in terms
of regional market (see the appendix, sec. C.1).
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divided into two groups (see table 1).15 The ﬁrst group includes countries where the
average domestic cement consumption in 2011–12 was less than 70% of 2007 levels.16
We name this group “low demand” (LD) countries. Of the LD countries, we present
some of the results separately for Greece and Spain, as these two member states were
particularly affected by the downfall. The LD countries represented 51% of EU ETS
cement emissions in 2008 and 40% in 2012. The remaining countries are classiﬁed as
“moderate demand” (MD).
Third, the cement sector is characterized by relatively homogeneous products
and production processes, unlike chemicals and steel, for example, with many prod-
uct categories and differentiated impacts. This aspect does not make distortions
due to ALTs more likely to occur but facilitates their quantiﬁcations. Indeed, al-
location is determined with activity levels (q/HAL, in the cement sector, q being the
quantity of clinker), but data on output are not publicly available at the installa-
tion level. However, data on emissions are available, thanks to the European Union
Transactions Log (EUTL). Because of the very strong and direct relationship be-
tween production of clinker, a highly homogeneous product, and emissions, it is
possible to infer production (activity) from emissions.17
2.2. Conceptual Framework and Main Assumptions
The quantiﬁcation of distortions due to the thresholds necessitates the elaboration
of counterfactual states of the world for 2012 (what would have happened had the
threshold rule not been implemented, that is, under scenarios EX, OBA, or had
it been implemented and had the ﬁrms not reacted strategically) for each relevant
15. Note that Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Malta have no listed clinker plants in the
EUTL database, while data for Cypriote plants were not able to be exploited due to missing
data.
16. The average of 2011 and 2012 was taken since both years are relevant to the analysis
that follows here. The year 2007 is taken as the reference year since this was the year in
which demand peaked in most EU member states prior to the economic crisis of 2008.
17. We use the observed ratio of publicly reported veriﬁed emissions (E) relative to the
historical emissions level (HEL), to proxy the share of unobserved activity level relative to
historical activity level (HAL), i.e., E/HEL ≈ q/HAL. This approximation is possible be-
cause the emissions intensities of clinker production have changed only very marginally in
the EU in recent years between 2005 and 2012 (GNR database; WBCSD 2014). At ﬁrst
sight, the approximation E/HEL ≈ q/HAL may turn problematic for precisely distinguishing
between installations that are above or below thresholds (25% and 50% of q/HAL). How-
ever, as detailed in the appendix, sec. A.1, we ensure that installations are correctly identiﬁed
using 2013 allocations data. This reveals whether or not the installation had seen its alloca-
tion reduced because of 2012 activity levels. Further, 2013 allocation data also allowed us to
obtain clinker carbon intensity at the plant level and then to assess production through
emissions (see the appendix, sec. A.2).
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market. A straightforward caveat is that our results are then very dependent on the
counterfactuals, which is estimated by combining historical data of country- and
plant-level characteristics using a panel data model. We conduct Monte Carlo
analysis to assess conﬁdence intervals and conduct a number of robustness tests to
limit this caveat.
We consider a “state of the world” as consisting of:18
• Consumption and price of cement;
• Production of clinker and cement, distribution of this production among
plants, clinker to cement ratio;
• Trade ﬂows of cement and clinker.
We know the (actual) state of the world for EX in 2011 and for EXALTG in
2012 thanks to trade and emissions data, the close relationship between emissions
and clinker production, and conservation principles. We need to construct counter-
factuals for 2012 for OBA, EX, and EXATNG. There are two issues: the change
in economic conditions from 2011 to 2012 (cement consumption fell by 13% at the
EU level between 2011 and 2012) and the possible impacts of the allocation rules
(we expect that ALTs led to an increase in the production of clinker to get a higher
level of free allocation).
We now detail our main methodological assumptions. We start with the second
issue: the role of the allocation rule.
Hypothesis H1: The state of the world is identical for OBA, and EX/
EXALTNG.19
Table 1. Moderate- (MD) and Low Demand (LD) Countries in Terms of Cement
Consumption in 2012 Relative to 2007 Levels
Low Demand (LD) Countries Moderate Demand (MD) Countries
Ireland, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia,
and Baltic countries
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland,
France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden,
and United Kingdom
Note.—There are no clinker plants in Malta, Lichtenstein, and Iceland. Emissions data on two clinker
plants of Cyprus are available from 2012 only; hence they cannot be used in this analysis.
18. The amount of free allocation received is then excluded from the “state of the world.”
19. EX and EXALTNG have by deﬁnition the same state of the world and differ only
by the allocation method.
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We assume that ﬁrms take for granted that the ex ante free allocations have been
obtained through a leakage argumentation so that they will not pass through the
marginal cost of carbon to consumers. This implies that the only difference in the
corresponding counterfactual scenarios refers to the amount of free allocations.
This assumption appears at odds with the economic literature (Demailly and
Quirion 2006; Fischer and Fox 2007), which would clearly distinguish between ex
ante free allocations and ex post OBA. Ex ante free allocations do not provide any
protection against leakage because the marginal cost of production is not affected (as
long as a plant operates ex ante free allocation only implies a lump-sum transfer). In
contrast, with ex post OBA allocations, marginal cost is unchanged because free
allocation is directly proportional to output; hence there are no competitive impacts
with respect to imports. This is the usual argument in favor of OBA. Cement con-
sumption and price would then differ depending on which of these two allocation meth-
ods are used.
H1 is supported by a series of in-depth interviews with cement sector actors in the
EU ETS (Neuhoff et al. 2014, 26). These interviews point out three reasons why in
practice, no price change (cost pass-through) was observed in the cement sector so
far. First, the ex ante free allocations were given out, precisely to mitigate carbon
leakage. Thus ﬁrms perceived a risk of losing future free allocations if they passed
through the cost of carbon and there was no leakage. Second, companies reported
that long-term strategic considerations—such as maintaining market share and good
client relationships—could partially balance the incentive to pass the carbon price.
Third, they perceived the risk of drawing the attention of competition authorities
due to abnormal proﬁt levels, if the pass-through of the carbon cost led to large
windfall proﬁts.20 It is important to note that these empirical observations have been
made in a context of low carbon prices. We certainly do not claim that H1 would
prevail at all times.
Hypothesis H2: The cement consumption and price for EXALTG is identical
to the one of EX/EXALTNG.
Since the clinker production is likely to increase through gaming, the question is what
happens to the excess production of the plants that game the scheme. This assump-
tion says that this excess production affects the clinker plant distribution, the trade
ﬂows, and the clinker to cement ratio but not the consumption (quantity and price).
From H2 we shall derive the trade ﬂows for the other scenarios through an economet-
20. The UK Competition Commission has argued that UK cement ﬁrms enjoyed abnor-
mal proﬁts even without passing through the cost of carbon: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases
/aggregates-cement-and-ready-mix-concrete-market-investigation.
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ric analysis of the historical trends. The difference between this estimation with the
observed trade ﬂows for EXALTNG can be attributed to the introduction of ALT
and the gaming.
Neuhoff et al. (2014) indeed identify the three above channels: reshufﬂing of
production among plants (this may be quite easily done since many cement compa-
nies are multiplants), exports to non-EU countries, and increase in the clinker to
cement ratio. The data support the extensive use of these three channels. This does
not exclude that a small fraction of the excess production goes into the regional
market. Our assumption is that this fraction can be neglected because of the oligop-
olistic nature of competition. Increasing the regional supply would most certainly
depress the price substantially, and increasing a plant market share would most cer-
tainly induce strong reactions from competitors.
We now come back to the change in the economic conditions. We shall assume
that the distribution of clinker production among plants remains proportional to
the change in consumption with some corrections for coastal plants and plant capac-
ity. Having estimated counterfactual production levels by installation,21 we can esti-
mate the number of free allowances (EUA for EU Allowance, which is the ofﬁcial title
pollution permits traded in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme) received at the plant
level under the various scenarios.22
The two hypotheses H1 and H2 allow us to construct a counterfactual plant
activity common to the counterfactual scenarios (EX, EXALTNG, and OBA) in
the absence of data or models to directly assess the effects of allocation methodolo-
gies on consumption and prices. We argue that the empirical evidence reported in
Neuhoff et al. (2014) is persuasive and supports these assumptions. However,
given the discrepancy with the literature, it is important to see how our results
would stand if H1 or H2 were relaxed. This is done in section 3.7.
To convert the free allocation and emission effects into monetary value, we shall
assume a CO2 price at 7.95 €/t, which corresponds to the average future price
(December 2013) during the year 2012.23
21. As we perform a Monte Carlo analysis, there is not “one” counterfactual but 10,000.
For simplicity, we will explain the reasoning as if there was just one (these different steps are
simply repeated for each sample of counterfactual).
22. As an example, let us consider a plant, which is functioning at 50% E/HEL and
receiving 1 million EUAs. Suppose that our econometric model ﬁnds that the counterfactual
activity level of this plant is 40%. This plant would have received 0.4 million EUAs under
OBA, 1 million EUAs under EX and EXALTG, 0.5 million EUAs under EXALTNG. In
this short example, we see that gaming from 40% to 50% allows obtaining 0.5 MEUAs more
allowances, but involves 0.11 Mt CO2 of additional emissions, so that the net gain in terms
of allowances is 0.39 MEUAs.
23. Data from ICE database (http://data.theice.com/MyAccount/Login.aspx).
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Hypothesis H3: The increased production due to gaming is sold at marginal
cost (excluding emission cost) and has no impact on proﬁts.
In practice, plants may actually sell their excess production at a higher or lower price,
the important point being that the associated revenue be higher than the associated
inefﬁciency costs (see sec. 1.2). The precise ﬁnancial impact is bound to depend on
circumstances speciﬁc to each plant which are unobservable. H3 allows for an esti-
mate of the ﬁnancial impact.
In summary, for each scenario, we compute production, emissions, and allocation.
The net allowances (allocations minus emissions) are compared for the scenarios EX,
EXALTNG, EXALTG, and OBA. Comparing other scenarios to OBA gives an
estimation of overallocation proﬁts (in MEAUs or M€). The difference between
EXALTG and EXALTNG gives the impact of gaming. Table 2 summarizes how
allocations and production are obtained under each scenario, and table 3 lists the data
sources.
Comparing counterfactual net exports to real net exports gives the parts of the
excess clinker production which are destined for clinker exports and cement exports.
Assuming no stockpiling, the remaining part is attributed to a change in the clinker
ratio.
2.3. Estimation Strategy
Counterfactual values for clinker plant activity are predicted based on panel data
estimations at the plant level. We use ﬁrst differencing in order to control for
country-level time invariant factors and the autoregressive nature of plant activity.
The regression includes both country-level data (cement consumption, GDP) and
plant-level characteristics, such as carbon intensity, size, and geographical location
(coast) as detailed in section 2.2 and in the appendix, sec. C, available online. To
assess the robustness of our results we use a semiparametric approach (Powell 1994)
by speciﬁcally modeling the multiplicative error of our estimation. The counterfac-
tual plant activity level is then not ﬁxed but a random variable. We perform a Monte
Table 2. Scenarios
Scenarios Allocations Production
OBA Proportional to activity (HAL ×
ALCF <-> q in eq. [1])
Counterfactual (explained in the
appendix, sec. C.1)
EX Independent of activity (ALCF =
1 in eq. [1])
Same as OBA
EXALTNG Hybrid (eq. [1]) Same as OBA
EXALTG Same as EXALTNG Actual 2012 production
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Carlo simulation with 10,000 samples and report the average and the 95% conﬁ-
dence interval.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Impact of ALTs on the Plant Distributions
Figures 2 and 3 display the distribution of plant activity levels for 2012 (EXALTG),
the counterfactual production (EX, EXALTNG, OBA), and also the distribution in
2011 for comparison.24 In LD countries, there is a marked jump (or “bunching”) in
installations operating around the 25% and 50% activity level thresholds in 2012,
whereas the counterfactual distribution for these countries is not skewed at the
Table 3. Data Sources
Variable Source
Emissions and HEL European Union Transaction Log
Clinker net exports (NEK) Eurostat. International trade, EU trade since 1988 by HS2,
4, 6, and CN8 data are originally given by country pairs.
Total net exports are recomputed. Product category:
“Cement Clinker” (252310)
Cement net exports (NEC) Eurostat. Product category: Difference between “Cement,
incl. cement clinkers” (2523) and “Cement Clinker”
(252310)
Cement consumption (CC) (1) Cembureau (2013) for the main European countries
(2) VDZ for Baltic countries and Norway (table C10).
Country GDP (GDP) World Bank
Clinker production (QK) EUTL-derived estimation (through estimated clinker carbon
intensity and emissions; see the appendix, sec. A.1). Where
there were data gaps, supplementary data were obtained
from several sources, e.g.:
• National cement association data when reliable and
exploitable, i.e., Oﬁcemen (2012) for Spain
• VDZ for Germany (table A2)
• Info Ciments (2013) for France
• Getting the Numbers Right database (GNR) for
available countries (UK, Italy, Poland, Czech
Republic, Austria)
24. There is not “one” but 10,000 versions of the counterfactual. The distribution dis-
played here corresponds to the central scenario (with average activity level for each plant).






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































thresholds. We ﬁnd that in LD countries where 117 of the 246 cement installations
are located, ALTs should have reduced free allocations in 50 of them, but due to
gaming, only in 20 installations were they reduced in reality. Thus, in line with
preliminary ﬁndings of Neuhoff et al. (2014), these results show clearly that cement
companies have indeed altered plant production levels in response to ALTs rules. In
MD countries, this response is noticeable but to a much less degree. The contrast
between LD and MD shows the importance of the demand collapse in triggering this
gaming behavior.
3.2. ALTs’ Impacts on Clinker Production and Emissions
Table 4 gives the clinker production and the emissions for 2012 (EXALTG) and
the counterfactual (EX, EXALTNG, OBA). The excess clinker production due to
the introduction of thresholds rule is quantiﬁed. It represents an increase of 15%
(+7.2 Mt) in LD countries, 28% (+3.5 Mt) for Spain, and 56% (+2.0 Mt) for
Greece. These increases are extremely large, even if the total impact at the EU level
is more modest (5%). The increase in the clinker production translates into increases
in emissions. Altogether we estimate that an additional 5.8 Mt CO2 (+5% of total
EU cement emissions) have been emitted by EU cement ﬁrms as a consequence of
the ALT-induced strategic behavior of cement companies.
3.3. Impact of Gaming on Plant Distribution on the Free Allowances
Table 5 gives the amount of EUAs that are allocated to cement installations under
the four scenarios (EX, EXALTNG, EXALTG, OBA). If installations received
100% of their allowances regardless of their activity (i.e., the allocation under the
EX scenario), then LD countries and MD countries would have received 74.5 and
70 million EUAs, respectively. OBA allocations would lower allocations to 36.1
and 62.2 million EUAs, respectively. The decrease in allocations is more signiﬁcant
for LD countries because the average activity is much lower.
As explained, the scenario EXALTNG can be seen as an imperfect approxima-
tion of the OBA rule (OBA represents a linear scheme with no thresholds). If there
had been no gaming, it would have set the allocations at 55.1 and 68.1 million EUAs
for LD and MD countries, respectively. Thus for the cement sector as a whole, ALTs
reduced free allocation in 2012 by 6.4 MEUAs or 4% compared to the scenario
without ALTs (EX). Had OBA been implemented instead, free allocation would have
been further reduced considerably by 46 MEUAs (32% reduction compared to EX),
which corresponds to 34% of the total cement sector free allocation in 2012. The effect
for the MD countries is negligible, as most of the installations have an activity level
superior to 50%. However, for LD countries the theoretical effect of the threshold rule
as an approximation of the OBA rule would have been more signiﬁcant: a 50% (i.e.,
(74.5 – 55.1)/(74.5 – 36.1)) reduction should have been obtained. With gaming
(EXALTG), a reduction of only 16% prevails (i.e., (74.5 – 68.4)/(74.5 – 36.1)). For
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Spain, the percentages would, respectively, be 61% and 20%; and for Greece, 73% and
24%. Further, we estimate the allowances gaming gain at 14.8 MEUAs, located
almost exclusively in LD countries, and a net gaming gain (deducing extra emissions)
of 9.0 MEUAs.
3.4. Financial Potential Gain Associated with Gaming
In the calculation of the potential gain we assume that the increased production is
sold at marginal cost and so has no impact on proﬁts. This gives an upper bound
for the proﬁts that could be achieved with gaming since it does not take into ac-
count the possible inefﬁciency costs: logistics cost for production shifting, extra sales
expenditures and rebates for increased exports, opportunity cost for increasing the
clinker to cement ratio. That there are inefﬁciency costs can be seen from the fact
that not all plants achieved the 50% threshold, but some gaming was certainly worth-
while since a large proportion of plants did manage to exceed the threshold.
To convert the increase in free allowances and the increase in emission rights into
monetary value, we need to assume a CO2 price. It should be clear that the amount
of proﬁtable gaming depends on the CO2 price. We shall come back to this point in
our discussion of the results. Table 6 gives the potential proﬁt associated with
gaming for a CO2 price at 7.95 €/t, which corresponds to the average future price
Table 4. Production and Emissions for the Observed (EXALTG) and Counterfactual








in Mtons 47.2 80.2 127.4 12.4
[45.2, 49.4] [76.9, 83.7] [123.6, 131.5] [11.5, 13.5]
Production (observed)
in Mtons 54.4 79.4 133.8 16.0
Increased production
in Mtons +7.2 –.8 +6.4 +3.5
[5.0, 9.2] [–4.2, 2.5] [2.3, 10.2] [2.5, 4.4]
p = 1.00 p = .33 p = 1.00 p = 1.00
Increased emissions
in Mtons CO2 +6.4 –.6 +5.8 +3.1
[4.5, 8.2] [–3.6, 2.2] [2.2, 9.1] [2.2, 3.8]
p = 1.00 p = .34 p = 1.00 p = 1.00
Note.—Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval. p is the
probability that the value is above zero. LD = low demand; MD = moderate demand.
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(December 2013) during the year 2012. Then it reﬂects more expected gains than
actual gains, which may be lower or higher (the CO2 price decreased the following
year, but ﬁrms may have banked these extra allowances and the CO2 price may rise
in the future).
For LD countries, the potential gain of EX relative to OBA is estimated through
the net increase of allowances, which is 74.5 – 36.0 Mt CO2 and an EUA price
7.95 €/t, which makes €306 million. With the introduction of the threshold rule
this increase would have been only €158 million had the ﬁrms not gamed the scheme.
The reduction is coming from the reduced amount of free allocations due to the
downfall in market demand. The gaming increases the amount of free allocations
but increases emissions, bringing a potential gain at €213 million, which represents
an increase of 35% (+€55 million) relative to €158 million. For Spain, the percent-
age increase is 44% (+€22 million) and for Greece it is 77% (+€10 million). These ﬁg-
ures are substantial even though the carbon price was low at that time. This explains
Table 5. Free Allowance Allocation Levels (MEUAs) for the Observed (EXALTG) and
Counterfactual (EX, OBA, EXALTNG) Scenarios, the Allowances Gain from Gaming,








EX 74.5 70.0 144.5 23.6 8.7
EXALTNG 55.1 68.1 123.2 14.9 4.3
[52.8, 57.3] [67.2, 68.9] [120.8, 125.6] [13.5, 16.3] [3.5, 5.1]
EXALTG
(observed) 68.4 69.6 138.1 20.7 7.3
OBA 36.1 62.2 98.2 9.5 2.7
[34.5, 37.7] [59.6, 64.9] [95.2, 101.5] [8.7, 10.2] [2.2, 3.2]
Allowances
gaming gain +13.3 +1.5 +14.8 +5.8 +3.0
[11.1, 15.6] [.7, 2.4] [12.5, 17.3] [4.4, 7.2] [2.2, 3.8]
p = 1.00 p = 1.00 p = 1.00 p = 1.00 p = 1.00
Net gaming
gain (minus
emissions) +6.9 +2.1 +9.0 +2.8 +1.2
[4.9, 9.0] [–.5, 5.0] [5.7, 12.5] [1.7, 3.8] [.6, 1.8]
p = 1.00 p = .94 p = 1.00 p = 1.00 p = 1.00
Note.—Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval. p is the
probability that the value is above zero. LD = low demand; MD = moderate demand.
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why ﬁrms undertake the various inefﬁciencies described earlier to capture part of
this gain.
3.5. Where Does the Excess Clinker End Up? Indirect Evidence Revisited
This section revisits the indirect evidence of excess clinker production proposed by
Neuhoff et al. (2014). As noted, three channels have been identiﬁed, production
shifting, exports increase, and clinker ratio increase.
3.5.1. Production Shifting in Multiplant Companies
Cement company executives reported, in interviews, that subsequent to the introduc-
tion of ALTs, it was a frequent practice to arrange production levels across plants to
ensure being above the threshold at as many units as possible (Neuhoff et al. 2014).
We observe output behavior consistent with these statements in several cement
companies which have a number of plants producing close to the thresholds. Table 7
presents four examples.25 In each of these ﬁrms in 2012, production (within the
same geographical country) simultaneously falls in one plant (which produced well
above the threshold in 2011), and rises in another plant above the threshold (which
was previously operating below the threshold).
3.5.2. Exports
Table 8 gives net exports of clinker and clinker embedded in cement from 2010 to
2012 for LD and MD countries. We observe a surge in clinker net exports in LD










EX 306 62 368 113 48
[292, 318] [40, 83] [342, 392] [107, 119] [44, 52]
EXALTNG 158 49 207 50 13
[145, 170] [27, 69] [181, 231] [44, 55] [9, 16]
EXALTG 213 66 278 72 23
[209, 216] [65, 67] [276, 281] [69, 74] [22, 24]
Note.—Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval. LD = low
demand; MD = moderate demand.
25. We only display here groups of installations belonging to a country-company that are
the most consistent with production shifting but avoid cherry-picking individual installations.
For the four cases, all installations of a certain country-company are displayed.
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countries: 6.21 Mt in 2012, compared to 2.03 Mt and 1.94 Mt in 2010 and 2011,
respectively. In contrast, MD countries remained small net importers of clinker and
no signiﬁcant shift was observed in their trade patterns. Further analysis revealed
that these clinker exports in 2012 were destined mainly to countries in Latin Amer-
ica and Africa, including Brazil, Togo, Ghana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauri-
tania and Nigeria.







Greece-W 1 34 49
Greece-W 2 77 66
Greece-W 3 11 0
Spain-X 1 42 50
Spain-X 2 57 46
Spain-X 3 68 56
Hungary-Y 1 41 46
Hungary-Y 2 68 50
Portugal-Z 1 34 64
Portugal-Z 2 55 51
Portugal-Z 3 71 60
Note.—An appropriate use of 2013 allocation data enables us to indirectly
distinguish installations that have been in 2012 above or below thresholds (25%
and 50% of q/HAL). We ﬁnd that whenever E/HEL is superior to 45% (re-
spectively 22%), the corresponding installation is above the ﬁrst (respectively sec-
ond) activity level threshold (see the appendix, sec. A.1 for more explanations).
Table 8. Clinker Net Exports in 2010, 2011, and 2012 in
LD and MD Countries in Millions of Tonnes
2010 2011 2012
LD countries:
Clinker 2.03 1.94 6.21
Clinker in cement 5.49 4.58 6.37
MD countries:
Clinker −.93 −.74 −.71
Clinker in cement 2.24 2.46 2.02
Note.—Data are from Eurostat; we use a common clinker ratio
of 75% to compute clinker embedded in cement. LD = low demand;
MD = moderate demand.
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3.5.3. Clinker Ratio
Another way excess clinker production might materialize is in a higher clinker-to-
cement ratio. That is, ﬁrms could use more clinker to produce the same ton of
cement. The clinker ratio can be recomputed at the macro level (state of group of
states) with the formula R =QK –NEK= CC þNECð Þ, where QK is the clinker pro-
duction, NEK and NEC are net exports of clinker and cement, and CC is the cement
consumption (see the appendix, sec. B, for explanation and table 3 for data source).
Table 9 shows the clinker ratio for the MD countries, LD countries, Spain, and
Greece. There is some suggestion that the historically declining trend in the clinker-
to-cement ratio reversed in 2012, notably in Spain and Greece. This is important be-
cause improvements in the clinker ratio have been the main driver of carbon abate-
ment in the EU cement sector.
3.6. Decomposing the Channels for Clinker Disposal
In order to understand better the effects of the distortions that arise from ALTs,
we attempt to decompose the excess clinker output into the main destinations to
which they are channeled through: changes to clinker ratio of domestic cement and
increase in exports (clinker or cement).26 Although it is likely that there is some
stockpiling, the lack of data makes it difﬁcult to attribute excess production to this
channel.
This decomposition requires that actual net export volumes of cement and
clinker are compared to counterfactuals levels (see the appendix, sec. C.2, for the
estimation method and data used). Assuming no stockpiling, we can attribute the
remaining excess clinker output to clinker ratio increase. Table 10 gives the results.
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation. For LD countries, net exports of
clinker increased by 6.2 Mt while our counterfactual is 4.6 Mt (+1.6 Mt); the net
export of cement increased by 8.5 Mt while the counterfactual is 6.1 Mt (+1.7 Mt
Table 9. Clinker-to-Cement Ratio in Selected Areas (%)
Clinker Ratio 2010 2011 2012
MD countries 76 76 77
LD countries 74 72 74
Spain 79 76 82
Greece 76 71 75
Note.—Data from authors’ analysis. LD = low demand;
MD = moderate demand.
26. Production shifting in multiplant companies does not generate excess clinker output;
hence, it is not quantitatively assessed.




































































































































































































































































of clinker embedded); this implies that 2.4 Mt of clinker went into the increased
content of clinker in cement. This latter ﬁgure represents an increase of 6% relative
to our counterfactual for the clinker to cement ratio as deﬁned in the previous sec-
tion. The values of clinker ratio effect are higher here than the estimates in section 3.5
suggesting that stockpiling of excess clinker output may be occurring, as well as
increased clinker ratio of cement exports.
3.7. Robustness and Caveats
In this section we brieﬂy discuss how our results would be affected if we were to
relax hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Let us brieﬂy recall these assumptions which
may be seen as behavioral rules reﬂecting the anecdotal evidence.
Hypothesis H1: The cement market (quantity and price) is identical for OBA,
and EX/EXALTNG.
Hypothesis H2: The cement market (quantity and price) for EXALTG is
identical to the one of EX/EXALTNG.
Hypothesis H3: The increased production due to gaming is sold at marginal
cost (excluding emission cost) and so has no impact on proﬁts.
Figure 4. Routes of excess clinker production decomposition
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We now detail the potential impact of adopting more standard hypotheses regard-
ing proﬁt-maximizing behavior. A change in the allocation rule will affect the cement
market (quantity and price) and the trade ﬂows (leakage). ALT rules need also to be
analyzed in terms of proﬁt maximizing. Qualitatively we certainly expect that going
from EX to OBA would increase the domestic consumption, increase domestic pro-
duction, decrease the output price, and reduce net imports. It would of course elimi-
nate the lump-sum proﬁts due to the ex ante free allocation rule. Going from EX to
EXALTNG would only matter in terms of decreasing these lump-sum proﬁts. Now
going to EXALTG would partly reduce the revised differences between EX and
OBA as regards the domestic consumption, the domestic production, the output
price, and the trade ﬂows. We can expect this because the reduction in domestic pro-
duction would be partly offset by the excess production to achieve the thresholds at
some plants, part of this excess production affecting the domestic market and the trade
ﬂows. We have neither the model nor the data to quantify how this change in hy-
potheses would quantitatively affect our results.
Fowlie et al. (forthcoming) provide some ideas on how this could be done. They
analyze the impact of various allocation schemes in the context of the US cement
industry. Their model incorporates two modeling features: short-term oligopolistic
Cournot competition with endogenous capacity constraints and leakage (imports are
introduced through a competitive fringe). The model is dynamic with incumbents
and entrants, and allows for investment strategies. Firms maximize their discounted
profits. The model is calibrated on a regional basis (US districts; areas roughly equiva-
lent to EUmember states) and then analyzed under various hypothetical scenarios.
Among other results, they point out differences between OBA, grandfathering
(EX), and grandfathering with closure rule (a weak version of EXALTG in which free
allocations are lost if the plant is closed). As expected, the cement market and the
trade ﬂows differ between OBA and grandfathering; the latter leads to lower domestic
production and more leakage. The difference in proﬁts depends on the level of the
lump-sum transfer associated with free allocations. The novel part of their analysis (the
standard economic literature on OBA reported in the introduction assumes a static
framework) concerns the difference between grandfathering and grandfathering with a
closure rule; the latter increases domestic production and reduces leakage, at least
temporarily. The introduction of the closing rule induces some gaming (excess domes-
tic production relative to EX), which is beneﬁcial to the incumbents.
It would certainly be interesting to use a similar approach to quantify how our
results would be affected if H1, H2, and H3 were replaced by more standard
economic assumptions based on explicit proﬁt maximizing. This may be particularly
important in a context of high carbon price since this may trigger more economic
behavior than the one we assumed. Still our intuition is that the qualitative insights
mentioned above would hold. This needs to be conﬁrmed by further work.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS
An important change in the EU-ETS Phase 3 for EITE concerns the introduction
of the activity level threshold rule (ALTs). The underlying rationale for its intro-
duction is that it would reduce the overallocation proﬁts in case of downfall in the
demand: whenever the activity level of an installation falls below some threshold
(50%, 25%, 10%) relative to its historic activity level used to allocate free alloca-
tions, the allocation would be reduced accordingly (50%, 75%, and 100%).
Our ex post analysis of the year 2012, the ﬁrst year in which the threshold rule
applies, focused on the cement sector, a sector in which approximately half the EU
countries had experienced a signiﬁcant downfall in consumption (LD countries). It
provides a natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of this rule.
Our main conclusion is that while ALTs did reduce to some extent overallocation
proﬁts, they also created operational distortions that led to outcomes inconsistent
with the low carbon transition of EU energy intensive industries. The reduction in
overallocation proﬁts is less than expected because of the gaming behavior of the
industry to achieve the thresholds, during periods of low market demand. Thanks to
the elaboration of a counterfactual, we have been able to quantify that after the in-
troduction of ALTs: the potential overallocation proﬁt with gaming is €278 mil-
lion (2 €/t clinker) and €207 million without gaming, while it would have been
€368 million in the absence of ALTs. The expected reduction in windfall proﬁts due
to the ALTs is 44%, while the actual reduction is 24%. The incentives are magniﬁed
in low demand countries, where proﬁt with gaming is €213 million (3.9 €/t clinker)
and €158 million without gaming, while it would have been €306 million without
ALTs.
In the 2000s, top management attention to the issues of climate change emerged
as an important dimension of corporate social responsibility, and a large number of
companies got involved in proactive strategies to limit their own emissions (Arjaliès,
Goubet, and Ponssard 2013). The EU ETS positively contributed to turn this strat-
egy into operational practice by putting a price on carbon. The distortions reported
in our study are particularly detrimental in this respect: if the threshold is not
achieved in a given plant this encourages the ﬁrm to increase its production to obtain
a lump-sum gain in free allowances. The cement industry has several ways to get rid
of this excess production without incurring signiﬁcant incremental costs on top of
the induced emission costs. It can reshufﬂe the production load at close-by plants. It
can increase the level of clinker in cement. It can also increase its exports to external
markets. All of this is at the detriment of the global corporate strategy to pursue a
low carbon transformation of the sector. Our study demonstrates that these effects
are substantial.
Our results have been obtained in a context of a low carbon price, severe downfall
in market demand, and large allocations of free allowances. However, a higher car-
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bon price would make our results even more relevant; the higher the carbon price,
the higher the incentive to achieve the thresholds.27 Had we observed growth, the
threshold rule may have been less relevant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that instead,
the reserve for new entrants may have been a more important source of distortions
(there would be an incentive to have an artiﬁcially high production level during the
period used to ﬁx the equivalent of HAL for new entrants).28
These considerations suggest that the activity level thresholds may need to be
reconsidered for sectors such as cement for which carbon costs represent a signiﬁcant
share of production costs. This raises the question of what to put in their place
instead. As mentioned in the introduction, economists generally agree that in the
absence of global carbon prices, replacing free allocation with full auctioning and
using border carbon adjustments offers the most efﬁcient solution. This is because it
helps in leveling the carbon costs between domestic and foreign producers while also
allowing for carbon costs to be passed along the value chain to incentivize demand
side abatement. Politically this solution has not yet gained serious traction. This is
largely due to concerns that border leveling may be perceived as protectionism dis-
guised as environmentalism and hence not conducive to building trust in interna-
tional climate negotiations. However, the situation may change. If one looks forward
to the post-2020 period, a larger number of nations are expected to have begun
implementing carbon prices. More countries will face similar challenges related to
designing appropriate anti-leakage measures that the EU now faces, and thus there
may be more scope for cooperative approaches. Border leveling via international co-
operation would, however, take time to negotiate and design. This raises the question
as to the interim solution.
One option is to increase the number of activity level thresholds to reduce the
incentive to game output. For example, a threshold at 50%, 60%, and 70% for ce-
ment may incentivize a larger number of installations to increase their clinker produc-
tion to the next highest threshold. Since thresholds create an allocation system that
falls between an ex ante and an ex post scheme, it would be much simpler to imple-
ment full output-based allocation for sectors like cement, where the risk of distortions
arising is high, because carbon costs are high relative to production costs in the
absence of free allocation. The analysis in this paper suggests that this option would
27. Taking an EUA price at 20 €/t, a simple extrapolation for LD countries would bring
up the potential windfall proﬁt to 236 × 20/9 = €524 million. However if we assume that
all plants achieve the 50% threshold, a reasonable assumption for an EUA price at 20 €/t, it
would go up to €583 million. The expected reduction remains at 42% but the actual one
drops to 22%. Note, however, that a high carbon cost might endanger the validity of
assumption H1 and could possibly lead to a result in which EXALTG would be preferred to
EX, but still worse than OBA.
28. Information from private conversation with industry representatives.
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outperform both ex ante allocation with and without thresholds in terms of reducing
distortions and overallocation proﬁts.
However, a number of issues must be carefully considered before going in that
direction. A central drawback of a move to OBA is that little can be expected in
terms of carbon price pass-through to product prices and, hence, demand side substi-
tution toward lower-carbon goods. For sectors where carbon costs are high as a share
of production costs, such as cement, this would signiﬁcantly limit the EU’s potential
to reduce emissions cost-effectively and to decarbonize these sectors. Unlike ex ante
allocation, OBA implies the loss of an absolute cap for free allocations, and this may
be a politically contentious point. Further, the implementation of OBA to selected
sectors may also raise political difﬁculties. There are ongoing discussions on how to
circumvent these issues. For example, the loss of demand side substitution incen-
tives could perhaps be restored with a consumption charge on downstream products
(Neuhoff et al. 2014). An output-based scheme with a hybrid benchmark was im-
plemented in California in 2012. An ex post study on this implementation would be
welcome to see if, again, the devil lies in the details.
APPENDIX
A. EUTL DATA COMPUTATIONS
A.1. Determination of the Activity Level Correction
Factor (ALCF2013) at the Plant Level
The key challenge is to correctly distinguish installations that are above or below
thresholds (25% and 50% of q/HAL), despite the limitation that activity levels have
to be approximated using emissions data (E/HEL). To do so, we exploit the obser-
vations from the 2013 allocation data, which revealed whether or not the installation
had seen its allocation reduced because its 2012 activity level fell below a threshold.
Allocations in 2013 are equal to (cf. eq. [1]):
Ai;2013 = CSCF2013  IB HALi  ALCFi;2013;
where CSCF2013 is the 2013 cross sectoral correction factor (0.9427), IB the clinker
carbon intensity benchmark (766 kg CO2 per ton of clinker), and HALi the histori-
cal activity level of installation i (in tons of clinker). Transforming the previous equa-
tion, where both HALi and ALCFi,2013 are unknown, we obtain:








Noting that Ii;HAL =HELi=HALi (corresponding approximately to the clinker car-
bon intensity for the HAL producing years), and IA is the average clinker carbon
intensity (863 kg CO2 per ton of clinker, GNR, indicator 321) in 2008.
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The ratio at the left part of the equation can be computed with available data.
On the right part, we have ALCFi,2013, which we want to ﬁnd, and the ratio,
Ii;HAL=IA, which is unknown as well but bounded and likely to be close to 1. Indeed,
Ii,HAL varies in an extreme range from 720 kg CO2 per ton of clinker to 1,300 kg
CO2 per ton of clinker (and for the very large majority of the plants from 780 to
950 kg CO2 per ton of clinker), which translates into a ratio Ii;HAL=IA varying from
0.83 to 1.51 (and most likely from 0.90 to 1.10). Then, if the ratio is between 0.83
to 1.51 (respectively between 1.67 and 3.01, and between 2.64 and 4.80),29 we infer
that ALCFi;2013 = 1 (respectively 0.5 and 0.25).
This enabled catching out situations in which imperfections in the E/HEL mea-
sure as a proxy for the q/HAL would have led to a false conclusion about whether
an installation was truly above or below its activity threshold in 2012. We found
that the actual thresholds for the E/HEL measure that matched the 2013 allocation
data were slightly lower in practice, at 22% and at 45%, rather than 25% and 50%.
Discussion with industry experts revealed that there was a logical explanation for this
systematic bias: clinker producers often have more than one kiln inside an installation
that is treated as a single unit for free allocation purposes. When demand falls, it is
common to concentrate production in the most efﬁcient kiln(s). Thus emissions may
fall by slightly more than overall clinker production, creating a slight downward bias
in E/HEL as a measure of q/HAL in low demand countries. This bias could also be
explained by the clinker carbon intensity improvement between HAL years and 2012
or to the fact that it is the responsibility of the company to report to the authorities
if it is producing under the threshold.30
A.2. Determination of Clinker Carbon Intensity
and Production at the Plant Level
Once the ALCFi;2013 has been determined at the plant level i (see previous section),
the plant clinker carbon intensity for HAL years, Ii,HAL , can then be obtained with
the previous equation.
For 20 plants (out of 246), we found an unusual number (below 700 kg CO2 per
ton of clinker), possibly due to a capacity increase, and put instead a default value
equal to IA. We also set the default value IA when Ai;2013 = 0 (meaning ALCFi;2013 = 0
or plant closure), making the computation impossible (15 plants).
We then correct the ﬁrst approximation of clinker carbon intensity so that
weighted average clinker carbon intensity in big countries corresponds to GNR data
in 2008 (818, 831, 832, 797, 847, 858, 849, and 842 kg CO2 per ton of clinker for,
respectively, Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and
29. In our data there is actually a gap between 2.14 and 4.01, so no case of overlapping.
30. At least in France, re private conversation with a policy maker.
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the United Kingdom).31 Finally, we correct values of clinker carbon intensity in
plants of other countries in the same way, as the European weighted average clinker
carbon intensity (IA).
Once clinker carbon intensity is estimated for each plant, clinker production can
be obtained through emissions (QK;i;t=Ei;t  Ii;HAL). We assume that clinker carbon
intensity does not evolve over time.
B. MACRO DATA CONSISTENCY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
If we denote the six different variables:
• QK, clinker production,
• QC, total cement production,
• NEK, clinker net exports,
• NEC , cement net exports,
• CC , cement consumption,
• R, clinker-to-cement ratio,
we have two equations translating the conservation of cement on the one hand and
the conservation of clinker on the other hand (neglecting stockpiling):
QC = CC þNEC;
QK = R QC þNEK:
These equations must be veriﬁed for each country every year (for real or counter-
factual scenario).
In this paper for real data, QK, NEK, NEC, and CC are obtained through differ-
ent sources (see table 3), and QC and R are recomputed (we have R =QK –NEK=
CC þNECð Þ).
C. COUNTERFACTUAL CLINKER PRODUCTION
AND NET TRADE ESTIMATIONS
C.1. Plant-Level Clinker Production Estimation
We calculate counterfactual clinker production levels of a plant in 2012 and char-
acterize output behavior of ﬁrms conditional on national and plant-level variables.
As noted, the unobserved level activity of plant i in year t is approximated by the
observed level of emissions PlantActivityi;t ≈ Ei;t=HELi, the activity level of plant i in
year t (ratio of emissions divided by historic emissions level). As noted also, we
31. The weights are production, as multiplying plant emissions by this ﬁrst approxima-
tion of clinker carbon intensity gives a ﬁrst approximation of clinker production at the plant
level (Q˜K;i;2008=Ii;HAL  Ei;2008).
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assume that cement consumption is independent of allocation rules. Therefore, ce-
ment consumption would have been the same in 2012 had the ALTs rule not been
implemented.
We use a multiplicative panel data model to estimate the following speciﬁcation
of clinker production level in plant i at time t to obtain parameters used to calculate
counterfactual activity level in 2012:
ΔlnPlantActivityi;t = α0 þ β1ΔlnCementConsumc∋i;t þ β2ΔlnGDPc∋i;t
þ γ1lnRelativeCO2Intensityi þ γ2lnRelativePlantSizei
þ γ3Coasti þ εit:
In order to accommodate the autoregressive nature of plant activity, we deﬁne all
country-level variables (source of the data is in table 3), including the dependent var-
iable in ﬁrst differenced terms. This allows us to difference out the time-invariant
country-speciﬁc heterogeneity, using adjacent observations. The dependent variable
is the (ﬁrst differenced) natural log of the activity level of plant i in year t. Cement
consumption and GDP are also expressed in ﬁrst differenced natural log terms. In
addition, we include time invariant plant-level variables: the relative average carbon
intensity of a plant;32 relative plant size;33 and a dummy variable for coastal plants.34
In order to minimize measurement errors that would bias the regression, we regroup
some small countries into larger entities that are coherent in terms of regional market:
Baltic countries, Benelux, Norway-Sweden, and Slovenia-Italy. As the Breush-Pagan
test reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors clustered at the
country level are used.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the country level. The de-
pendent variable is the ﬁrst differenced natural log of plant activity level. The sample
includes 246 clinker-producing plants identiﬁed as operating between 2010 and 2012,
across 26 EUmember states, for the years 2008–11.
Table A1, column 1, shows the results for the period 2008–11 (postcrisis).
Cement consumption has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on clinker production, with
32. The relative carbon intensity is deﬁned as the natural log of carbon intensity at the
plant level divided by the average carbon intensity in the country it is located (RelativeCO2
Intensityi = lnðIHAL;i=IHAL;c∋iÞIHAL;c∋i i), where IHAL;c∋i is the average carbon intensity of plants (in
tons of CO2 per ton of clinker) in the country where the plant i is located.
33. This is deﬁned as the natural log of the historical activity level of the plant divided
by the average historical activity level in the country it is located (lnRelativePlantSizei=
lnðHALi=HALc∋iÞHALc∋ii), where HALc∋i is the average historical activity level (in Mt of
clinker) in the country where the plant i is located.
34. The dummy Coastit is equal to 1 if the plant is located near the coast (less than
50 km; this was done thanks to the geolocalization of the plants in the EUTL data). It
concerns 61 plants out of 246.
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an estimated elasticity of 0.819 (hence, if the demand at the country level decreases
by 10%, the production at the plant level decreases by 8.19%). GDP is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, with an estimated elasticity of 0.235. The relative plant size is not
signiﬁcant. Conversely, the carbon intensity of the plant has a negative effect, sug-
gesting that production is lower in the most carbon intensive plants. Finally, the
parameter Coastal is statistically signiﬁcant and also negative. Production in coastal
plants is lower by 4% on average than in inland plants. We could also have expected
the opposite (coastal plants producing more, e.g., their production declining less, in
order to export). This could reﬂect a strategy of cement companies to diminish pro-
duction in coastal plants in the long run.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a ﬁxed effects model that includes plant-
level ﬁxed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of clinker
production behavior. Parameter estimates from the ﬁxed effects regressions are sim-
ilar, suggesting that the combination of country-level ﬁxed effects (implemented by
ﬁrst differencing) and time-invariant plant-level variables do a good job at control-
Table A1. Regression Results of Corrections at the Plant Level
(1)




Log relative carbon intensity −.333***
(3.05)







Plant-level ﬁxed effects No
R2 .21
Note.—Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country
level. The dependent variable is the ﬁrst differenced natural log of plant
activity level. The sample includes 246 clinker-producing plants identiﬁed
as operating between 2010 and 2012, across 26 EU member states, for the
years 2008–11.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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ling for heterogeneity in our random effects estimation. A number of further robust-
ness tests were conducted. For example, we additionally ran the same speciﬁcation
using the correlated random effects model (Wooldridge 2010) and also tested the
inﬂuence of other obtainable variables to predict clinker output, including year dum-
mies, lagged values, square terms. We found that the results were stable across the
various estimators and speciﬁcations.
These parameters from column 1 are thus used to estimate counterfactual activ-
ity level. In order to give results robust to uncertainty, we use a semiparametric ap-
proach (Powell 1994) by speciﬁcally modeling the multiplicative error. The counterfac-
tual plant activity level is then not ﬁxed but is a random variable:





 RelativeCO2Intensity γ^1i  RelativePlantSize γ^2i
 exp γ^3Coastið Þ  expðε˜Þ:
Extending the smearing estimate of Duan (1983), we ﬁrst ﬁt the distribution of ε˜ with
a kernel density estimation as in Horowitz and Markatou (1996), which gives us its
piecewise linear cumulative distribution function. The latter allows us simulating ε˜
(which has a standard deviation of 14%) via inverse transform sampling. We perform a
Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 samples and report the average and the 95%
conﬁdence interval in tables 5 and 6.
C.2. Country-Level Net Exports of Clinker and Cement Estimation
Counterfactual net exports of clinker and cement for each country are necessary to
assess the channels of clinker disposal. A comprehensive analysis was not possible
given the available data, and instead we use a simple ﬁrst differenced estimation to
control for country-level ﬁxed effects and include cement consumption as the main
explanatory variable.35 This enables us to essentially extrapolate historic net export
trends, while accounting for the inﬂuence of annual variation in cement consump-
tion. The parameters are obtained from the following regression using data for the
years 2008–11 and 20 countries:
ΔNEKc;t = λ0 þ λ1ΔCementConsumc;t þ εc;t
ΔNECj;t = μ0 þ μ1ΔCementConsumc;t þ εc;t:
35. As suggested by the Hausman test (if p-values are low, ﬁxed effects are preferred),
we used a ﬁxed effect model. As the modiﬁed Wald test reveals the presence of hetero-
skedasticity, we present robust standard errors.
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For clinker net exports, the coefﬁcient on λ1 is –0.162 and this is signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Hence on average, if cement consumption decreases by 1 Mt, clinker
net exports increase by 0.16 Mt. The negative sign on λ1 is in line with expectations.
The ﬁt is good for the clinker net exports (R2 = 0.41). For net cement exports, the
coefﬁcient on the cement consumption term is 0.025 and is not statistically signif-
icant at conventional levels. Changes in cement consumption thus do not predict
changes in cement net exports, and in this case the counterfactual is an extension of




K; j þ λ1ΔCementConsmc;2012
and counterfactual net exports of cement as:
ΔNECF2012C; j =NE
2011
C; j þ μ1ΔCementConsmj;2012:
It should be noted that the cement consumption was remarkably low in 2012. Be-
cause of the consumption/export relationship established by the econometric model,
clinker net exports would have risen anyway in 2012 compared to 2011 had the
threshold rule not be implemented.
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